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STATEMENT OF THE ISSUES PRESENTED FOR REVIEW 
1 . Did the lower court err in awarding judgment to the 
Plaintiffs dismissing Defendants1 Counterclaim with prejudice 
where the Plaintiffs herein are not entitled to a dismissal of 
the actions pursuant to Rule 41(b) of the Utah Rules of Civil 
Procedure. 
2. Did the lower court err in assessing the points of 
law as set forth in Plaintiffs-Respondents memorandum of points 
and authorities in support of motion to dismiss Counterclaim 
where such points collectively support Defendants position in 
the interest of said Counterclaim. 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
This action was initially commenced in April of 1974 
with the filing of a Complaint in the Fourth Judicial District 
Court in and for Utah County, State of Utah by Plaintiffs/ 
Respondents in this matter. Defendants/Appellants filed their 
Counterclaim and Answer in September of 1974 pursuant to a number 
of motions, the appointment of a receivership, and dissolution of 
the same. 
Judge J. Robert Bullock signed an Order and Decree 
stipulated to by both parties, dated May 16, 1979, placing the 
case on the inactive calendar for good cause subject to 
reactivation by court or counsel as may be procedurally proper. 
Upon Defendants/Appellants reinitiation of action in 
accordance with the stipulated terms for reactivation, 
Plaintiffs/Respondents filed a motion to dismiss Counterclaim for 
failure to prosecute. The Court found that "evidence pertaining 
to the Defendants claims and the Counterclaim has been lost and 
that memories had been dimmed". Further, the Court found that a 
"dismissal of the Counterclaim would not be an injustice." 
The cases presented to the lower Court for review by 
Plaintiffs/Respondents in this matter, collectively support 
Defendants/Appellants position setting forth their right to a 
proper hearing where, prior to this motion for dismissal all of 
the litigants had power to obtain relief and failed to do so; 
where consideration should have been given to the conduct of both 
parties, and to the opportunity to move the case forward; and 
where an order dismissing the suit with prejudice on the "ground 
that Plaintiff had failed to diligently prosecute (the) action 
was an abuse of discretion, notwithstanding unusual delay in 
getting case to trial ..." (Rules of Civil Procedure, Rules 37, 
55(c), 60(b). 
This appeal is taken from the injustice rendered in the 
lower Court's decision to grant Plaintiffs/Respondents motion to 
dismiss Counterclaim where Defendants/Appellants have the right 
to be heard and any delay was contributed to by interim attendant 
litigation and justified by the Stipulation entered into by both 
parties placing this case on the inactive calendar until properly 
reactivated. 
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STATEMENT OF FACTS 
1 . The Complaint in this matter was filed with the 
Fourth Judicial District Court in and for Utah County, State of 
Utah, on March 25, 1974 by M. Dayle Jeffs reportedly in behalf of 
the Plaintiffs named herein, against Shelley Irrigation 
Development, Inc., and its officers, requesting the Court to 
place the corporation in an immediate ex parte receivership, 
charging wrong doing on the part of corporate officers and 
alleging that the Small Business Administration of the United 
States of America had informed the Plaintiffs that the Small 
Business Administration was going to foreclose and sell the 
company's assets. 
2. On or about September 10, 1974, the Defendants by 
and through counsel Summerhays & Hatch filed an Answer and 
Counterclaim. Between the date of the filing of the Complaint 
and the Answering Counterclaim, there were several Orders to Show 
Cause and Motions regarding the appointment of a receivership and 
a dissolution of the same. 
3. At a pre-trial set for this matter the parties 
hereto entered into a stipulation for the dismissal of the 
receivership with both parties reserving their rights in the 
lawsuit to pursue their respective causes of action. It was also 
stipulated at the time by both parties that the matter should be 
placed on an inactive calendar until such time as the Court or 
counsel in either case shall reactivate the matter by proper 
Court procedure. 
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4. The Defendants meanwhile were compelled to address 
the financial problems resulting from funds cut off by the Small 
Business Administration and by Valley Bank. This resulted in two 
additional matters of litigation eventually placed in Federal 
Court. Until the reactivation of this matter Shelleys1 available 
funds were obligated in the above referenced litigation which 
was costly. The results of this litigation are deemed to be 
attendant to Defendants case in the instant matter. 
5. It was also the Defendants1 charge to find and 
retain new counsel in this matter pursuant to the relocation to 
Washington, D.C. of Counsel Orrin G. Hatch. 
6. On or about July 11, 1984, the Defendants in this 
action filed with the Court and sent a copy to each Plaintiff a 
Notice to Appoint Counsel thereby properly reactivating this 
matter before the Court. At the same time Plaintiffs were sent 
copies of Requests for Production of Documents, Interrogatories, 
Notices for taking of various Depositions, a Motion to Compel 
Discovery or in the Alternative to Strike Pleadings, a Motion 
for Trial Date, and various other documents in the interest of 
reactivating and pursuing this case. 
7. Thereafter on or about August 15, 1984, Plaintiffs 
filed a Motion to Dismiss by and through new counsel, Richard B. 
Johnson. On September 20, 1984, Judge J. R. Bullock dismissed 
Defendants1 Counterclaim with prejudice, citing Rule 41(b) of the 
Utah Rules of Civil Procedure, and stating that Plaintiffs said 
evidence had been lost and memories dimmed, and that dismissal 
would not be an injustice to Counterclaimants. 
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SUMMARY OF ARGUMENTS 
Plaintiffs were not entitled to the dismissal of 
Defendants1 Counterclaim under Rule 41(b) of the Utah Rules of 
Civil Procedure since, contrary to the provisions therein, the 
parties complied with the Stipulation and Court Order in 
connection therewith. 
Plaintiffs1 Memorandum of Points and Authorities in 
Support of Motion to Dismiss outlined Plaintiffs1 view with 
respect to three of the cases cited from Pacific Reports 2d and 
referred the reader to see also three additional cases. A 
review of these six cases presents exemplary argument in the 
interest of Defendants/Appellants setting forth their right to a 
fair hearing of facts in a Court of Law. 
Although the Court signed judgment upon the entry 
prepared by Plaintiffs1 counsel saying "The Court, after 
considering the memoranda of the parties, having heard testimony 
and received evidence and being fully advised in the premises..." 
it is apparent upon a complete review of Plaintiffs/Respondents 
points and authorities in support of their Motion to Dismiss 
Counterclaim that such documentation was not carefully examined 
and weighed fairly in the interest of both parties; wherefore, an 
injustice resulted from the entry of Judgment in this matter. 
ARGUMENT 
THE LOWER COURT ERRED IN GRANTING 
JUDGMENT TO PLAINTIFFS DISMISSING 
DEFENDANTS1 COUNTERCLAIM WITH 
PREJUDICE PURSUANT TO RULE 41(b) OF 
THE UTAH RULES OF CIVIL PROCEDURE, 
WHERE PLAINTIFFS WERE NOT ENTITLED 
TO DISMISSAL OF THE ACTION. 
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The Plaintiffs moved the lower Court for an order 
dismissing the Defendants Counterclaim under Rule 41(b) of the 
Utah Rules of Civil Procedure. Rule 41(b) states in relevant part 
as follows: "For failure of the Plaintiff to prosecute or to 
comply with these rules or any order of court a Defendant may 
move for a dismissal of an action or of any claim against him,." 
This Counterclaim and the actions of all parties herein 
should not have been dismissed pursuant to Rule 41(b) in as much 
as, contrary to the provisions therein, the parties in fact 
complied with the joint stipulation and order of the court in 
connection therewith. Plaintiffs1 Memorandum in support of their 
Motion to Dismiss states failure to prosecute this matter as the 
reason for dismissal of the actions. However, it would certainly 
be improper to dismiss this matter based upon failure to 
prosecute in view of the stipulation entered into by and among 
the parties hereto and the ensuing Court order to that effect. 
On or about March 19, 1979, the parties to this action stipulated 
in open Court, which stipulation was reduced to writing, that 
this matter may be placed on the inactive calendar until properly 
reactivated by judicial proceeding. It was further stipulated to 
by and among the respective parties at that time that the parties 
shall retain their right to pursue their respective claims as set 
forth in the Complaint and Counterclaim. A copy of the 
stipulation for dismissal of receivership and subsequent order 
containing these provisions is contained in the Addendum to this 
Appellant Brief. 
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The parties to this action complied with the stipulation 
and order of the lower Court and the matter had remained on the 
inactive calendar for that period of time until properly 
reactivated in accordance with said stipulation. In the 
meantime, Defendants had pursued another matter of litigation in 
Federal Court which action relates to the matters involved in 
this litigation. In the pursuit of that action the Defendants 
had undertaken immense discovery which has produced evidence 
which would support their Counterclaim in the instant action. It 
is the desire of the Defendants/Appellants at this time to pursue 
their Counterclaim in the furtherance of justice and in 
accordance with the stipulation and order of the Court allowing 
them to do so dated May 16, 1979, by the Honorable J. Robert 
Bullock. 
24 Am. Jur. 2d §58 Dismissal, states in relevant part as 
follows: "A motion for dismissal for want of or delay in 
prosecution will not ordinarily be granted when it appears that 
the Defendant has been responsible for the delay. Nor should a 
dismissal be granted where the evidence indicates that Defendant 
was equally responsible with Plaintiff for delaying trial of the 
action or was even partially responsible for the delay." Note 
Cervi v. Greenwood Village, 147 Colorado 190, 362 P.2d 1050, 
wherein both Plaintiffs and Defendants had stipulated to several 
postponements. 24 Am. Jur. 2d Dismissal §58, continues as 
follows: 
But a Defendant ordinarily is under no obligation to 
speed the trial and cannot be charged with neglect if 
he maintains his position and simply meets issues of 
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law and fact as the Plaintiff regularly calls them up 
for hearing. The responsibility rests on the Plaintiff 
to prosecute his case to final determination with 
reasonable diligence; beyond taking such steps as may be 
required in order to meet the actions taken by the 
Defendant. The Defendant may remain passive. It is the 
Plaintiff who has the obligation of going forward to 
escape the penalty of dismissal for delay; the burden is 
upon him to prosecute a case in due course and without 
z unusual delay, and to show that the delay in prosecting 
It was at the instance or caused by the Defendant. 
In the case of Johnson vs. Firebrand, Inc., (1977) 571 
P.2d 1368, the Utah Supreme Court ruled that it was an abuse of 
discretion to grant Defendants Motion for Dismissal with 
Prejudice where either party could have obtained relief to bring 
the case to a conclusion but neither did so for nearly four 
years. 
24 Am. Jur. 2d. §55 Dismissal, states in relevant part 
as follows: 
Statutes are rules of court providing that an action 
subject to dismissal if it is not brought to trial 
within a specified period not intended, it has been 
held, to close the proceedings in an arbitrary manner 
and in all events and the authority of the trial court 
to order dismissal for delay in prosecution should not 
ordinarily be exercised when there appears to be a 
reasonable excuse for such delay. (Emphasis added) 
In the instant case there was certainly a reasonable 
excuse for such delay i.e., the stipulation entered into among 
the parties and the subsequent order of the Court. Certainly 
neither parties should have been prejudiced by a dismissal of 
their actions pursuant to having entered into the stipulation. 
(/ 
-> 
( 
*/ 
/ 
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ARGUMENT 
THE LOWER COURT ERRED IN ENTERING 
JUDGMENT UPON THE MERITS OF PLAINTIFFS1 
COURT MEMORANDUM WHEREIN THE POINTS 
CITED PRESENT FINDINGS OF FACT AND 
CONCLUSIONS OF LAW IN SUPPORT OF DEFENSE 
RIGHT TO PROCEED WITH COUNTERCLAIM 
Plaintiffs1 Memorandum of Points and Authorities in 
Support of Motion to Dismiss Counterclaim sets forth six 
authorities in support of their argument. The following review 
of all six cases cited in that memorandum collectively support 
Defendants/Appellants position that the Defendants Counterclaim 
should not have been dismissed. 
1. Plaintiffs cited Utah Oil Company vs. Harris, 565 
P.2d 1135 (Utah 1977). In this case the Utah Supreme Court ruled 
that it was an abuse of discretion for the lower Court to dismiss 
with prejudice Plaintiff's claims for lack of diligence in 
prosecuting his claim where the delay was caused by negotiations 
between the parties and that neither party had requested a 
pre-trial conference on the setting of a trial date. The 
decision was reversed and the case remanded for proper hearing. 
2. Plaintiffs cited Polk v. Ivers, 561 P.2d 1075 
(1977). This case was also reversed and remanded by the Utah 
Supreme Court. The Court ruled that it was an abuse of 
discretion to grant a Motion to Dismiss for Lack of Prosecution 
where the case had remained dormant for a period of almost two 
years while neither parties counsel had pursued the matter. 
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Justice Wilkins, in commenting on this case, referred to 
a quote by Justice Crockett who in writing for this Court 
stated: 
. . . Whether there is such justifiable excuse is to be 
determined by considering more factors than merely the 
length of time since the suit was filed. Some 
consideration should be given to the conduct of both 
parties, and to the opportunity each has had to move the 
case forward . . . also what difficulty or prejudice may 
have been caused to the other side; and most important, 
whether injustice may result from the dismissal. 
(Westinghouse Electric Supply Co, v. Paul W, Larsen 
Contractor, Inc., Utah, 544 P.2d 876 (1975)) 
3. Plaintiffs cited the above referenced Westinghouse 
v. Larsen, supra, listing the elements to be considered by the 
trial Court as follows: 
1. The conduct of both parties. 
2. The opportunity each had had to move the case 
forward. 
3. What each of the parties have done to move the case 
forward. 
4. What difficulty or prejudice may have been caused 
by the other side. 
5. And, most important, whether injustice may result 
from the dismissal. 
This sets forth exactly Defendants/Appellants position 
that there was error in the lower Court's decision barring 
Crossclaimants1 right to be heard 1) in view of the conduct of 
both parties to the litigation, 2) in light of the stipulated 
agreement to place the matter on the inactive calendar, 3) 
noting the opportunity each party had to move the case forward, 
4) particularly noting Crossclaimants initiation to do so in 
accordance with the stipulated allowance for reactivation by 
proper Court procedure, 5) Noting the difficulty and prejudice 
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caused by Plaintiffs in moving the lower Court to Dismiss 
Defendants1 Counterclaim and 6) most importantly, a great 
injustice has resulted from the dismissal* 
Justice Crockett in conclusion on this ruling stated: 
... that the trial court failed to give proper weight to 
the higher priority; and that under the circumstances 
described herein, the order of dismissal was an abuse of 
discretion. It is therefore necessary that the order be 
vacated and the case remanded for further proceedings. 
4. Plaintiffs cited Wilson v. Lambert, 613 P.2d 765 
(Utah 1980). This case involved the appeal of a predecessor 
interest in a Complaint initially lodged following probate 
proceedings and without explanation as to delay. It is 
inappropriate to cite the above case having such different 
variables than the instant case which did in fact have adequate 
explanation as to delay in accordance with stipulated agreement, 
and wherein the nature of the Counterclaim is in the interest of 
the original complaining party. 
5. Plaintiffs cited Grundmann v. Williams, Utah 
Supreme Court No. 19674, filed June 2, 1984. In this case the 
Motion to Dismiss was granted after a "full hearing". Certainly 
there has not been a full hearing in the instant case for the 
Court to rule upon. 
6. Plaintiffs cited K. L. C., Inc. v. McLean, 656 P.2d 
986 comparing the K. L. C. case to this litigation stating "a 
factual situation was presented much like the facts in this 
case". The facts in the K. L. C. case are quite unlike those in 
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Baker et. al. v. Shelley, et. al. Any dormancy in the instant 
case was in accordance with the stipulation entered into by both 
parties to put the case on the inactive calendar until such time 
as appropriately reinstigated. Counterclaimants were also 
actively attending to related litigation during this period. 
There was no such stipulation or ongoing pursuance of attendant 
litigation of the above referenced K. L. C« v« MeLean, supra, 
case. There was no deferred trial date in the Shelley case. A 
hearing in the K. L. C» matter showed that a trial could serve 
no useful purpose upon such a lengthly duration of dormancy 
during which period no action was taken, unlike the instant case 
where ongoing attendant litigation was addressed, and during 
which time this matter was set on the inactive calendar in 
accordance with the above described stipulation. 
The stipulation referred to was set forth for the very 
purpose of enabling the reinstagation of this case and trial at a 
future date to resolve differences, inherently setting forth the 
the useful purpose of resumed litigation and trial. 
CONCLUSION 
Defendants/Appellants hereby appeal to the Supreme Court 
of the State of Utah for a reversal of the lower Court's decision 
to dismiss Defendants1 Counterclaim under Rule 41(b) of the Utah 
Rules of Civil Procedure. This rule would not apply where 
Defendants acted in accordance with the Stipulation and Court 
Order pertaining to the prosecution this case. 
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Where the weight of documentary evidence presented to 
the lower Court supports Defendants/Appellants right to a fair 
hearing in a Court of Law and where Defendants/Appellants 
Counterclaim experienced dormancy in accordance with the Order of 
the Court, it is apparent that a review of the law and issues in 
this matter demonstrate the relevance and importance of a proper 
hearing to examine the facts in this matter. 
It was inappropriate for the Plaintiffs/Respondents to 
move the lower Court for a dismissal of Defendants/Appellants 
Counterclaim in light of the Court ordered Stipulation setting 
forth the opportunity for either party to reinstigate the 
proceedings which was accordingly accomplished in a timely and 
appropriate manner by Defendants/Appellants. 
RESPECTFULLY SUBMITTED this / ^ day of Augxist, 1985. 
LAW OFFICES OF LOWELL V. 
SUMMERHAYS 
Lowell V. Sumraerhay^ s 
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TELEPHONE 373 6345 
Attorneys for Plaintiff Bryce W. Baker 
IN THE FOURTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT OF UTAH COUNTY 
STATE OF UTAH 
BRYCE W. BAKER, SPRINGVILLE, 
INVESTMENT CORPORATION, PAUL H. 
[THEOBALD, VERN RISSLER, FLOYD 
SUMSION, CHESTER ZOLLINGER, 
GAYLORD SWIM, ARNOLD HENDRICK-
SON, INNOVATION ENTERPRISES 
INCORPORATED, LOWELL CHRISTENSEN 
SID A BOURNE, JACK HOPKINSON, 
GLEN ROLAND and ROBERT BEALE 
III on behalf of themselves and 
all other stockholders of 
Shelley Irrigation Development, 
Inc., 
Plaintiffs, 
vs. 
MOTION TO DISMISS 
COUNTERCLAIM 
Civil No. 40,094 
SHELLEY IRRIGATION DEVELOPMENT, 
INC., a corporation, NED R. 
jSHELLEY, DEAUN SHELLEY, NED 
IRUSSELL SHELLEY, JR., and 
CHARLES EVERETT HULL, 
Defendants. 
COMES NOW the plaintiff Bryce W. Baker and moves the Court, 
[pursuant to Rule 41(b) of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure for the 
dismissal of this case on the basis that both sides, by their action: 
have failed to prosecute this action and it would not be in the 
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best interest of justice to allow either party to continue with the 
matter. 
There is attached hereto and incorporated herein a memorandum 
of points and authorities in support of the motion. 
DATED this fftfo day of August, 1984. 
iaCHAWV*'JOHNSON fOR: ^ ^ ^ 
HOWARD, LEWIS & PETERSEN 
Attorneys- for Plaintiff 
Bryce W. Baker 
MAILED a copy of the foregoing MOTION TO DISMISS COUNTERCLAIM 
to Mr. Lowell Summerhays, Attorney for Defendants, 420 Continental 
Bank Bldg. , Salt Lake City, Utah 84101; dated this \($\ day of Augusta 
1984. 
ECRETARY 
'iitit^ 
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IN THE FOURTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT OF UTAH COUNTY 
STATE OF UTAH 
BRYCE W. BAKER,, SPRINGVILLE : 
INVESTMENT CORPORATION, PAUL H. 
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SUMSION, CHESTER ZOLLINGER, 
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SID A. BOURNE, JACK HOPKINSON, 
GLEN ROLAND and ROBERT BEALE 
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v s . 
J U D G M E N T 
I SHELLEY IRRIGATION DEVELOPMENT, 
( I N C . , a c o r p o r a t i o n , NED R. 
| SHELLEY, DEAUN SHELLEY, NED 
jRUSSELL SHELLEY, J R . , and 
I CHARLES EVERETT HULL, 
i 
i Defendants . 
Civil No. 40094 
The plaintiffs' Motion to Dismiss the Counterclaim pursuant to 
Rule 41(b) of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure came on before the 
Court for hearing. The parties having previously submitted to the 
Court memorandum and in addition, the parties were allowed to put on, 
evidence pertaining to that issue on Thursday, September 20, 1984. 
The plaintiffs, Bryce W. Baker, Springville Investment Corporation, 
Paul H. Theobald, Vern Rissler, Floyd Sumsion, Gaylord Swim, 
Innovation Enterprises Incorporated, Lowell Christensen, Sid A. 
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Bourne, and Robert Beale, III, were represented by their attorney, 
Richard B. Johnson. The plaintiffs, Jack Hopkinson and Glen Roland 
were represented by their attorney, Robert L. Moody. The plaintiffs 
Chester Zollinger and Arnold Hendrickson were not represented. The 
defendants were represented by their attorney Lowell V. Sursiuerhays. 
The Court, after considering the memoranda of the parties, having 
heard testimony and received evidence and being fully advised in the 
premises, and having heretofore entered its Findings of Fact and 
Conclusions of Law, now makes and enters the following: 
JUDGMENT 
1. The Counterclaim of the defendants is hereby dismissed with 
prejudice with each side to bear their own costs and attorney's fees 
2. The Complaint of the plaintiffs is hereby dismissed with 
prejudice with each side to bear their own costs and attorney's fees 
DATED this day of November, 1984. 
BY THE COURT: 
JUDGE J. ROBERT BULLOCK 
MAILED a copy of the foregoing JUDGMENT to Mr. Robert L. Moody 
Attorney for Plaintiffs Roland and Hopkinson, P.O. Box 1466, Provo, 
Utah 84603; Mr. Chester Zollinger, 175 East 200 North, Providence, 
Utah 84332; Mr. Arnold Hendrickson, 136 South 4th East, Pleasant 
Grove, Utah 84062; Mr. Lowell V. Summerhays, Attorney for Defendant 
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ienters the following: 
CONCLUSIONS OF LAW 
1. The Court finds that the Counterclaim of the defendants 
[should be dismissed with prejudice based upon Rule 41(b) of the 
ptah Rules of Civil Procedure and the cases interpreting that rule. 
DATED this day of October, 1984. 
BY THE COURT: 
JUDGE J. ROBERT BULLOCK 
MAILED a copy of the foregoing FINDINGS OF FACT AND CONCLUSIONS 
bF LAW to Mr. Robert L. Moody, Attorney for Plaintiffs Roland and 
Hopkinson, P.O. Box 1466, Provo, Utah 84603; Mr. Chester Zollinger, 
0.75 East 200 North, Providence, Utah 84332; Mr. Arnold Hendrickson, 
p.36 South 4th East, Pleasant Grove, Utah 84062; Mr. Lowell V. 
Summerhays, Attorney for Defendants, 420 Continental Bank Bldg., 
Bait Lake City, Utah 84101; dated this 3 day of October, 1984. 
(5E/RETARY' 
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KiLMAKD B. f c«NS0N, FOR: 
HOWARD. LEfrlS & PETERSEN 
ATTORNEYS AND COUNSELORS AT LAW 
120 EAST SOO NORTH STRICT 
P. O. Box 7 7 S 
PROVO. UTAH 84BOS 
TELEPHONE. 3 7 3 - 6 S 4 S 
Attorneys for P l a i n t i f f S 
IN THE FOURTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT OF UTAH COUNTY 
STATE OF UTAH 
BRYCE W. BAKER,, SPRINGVILLE : 
INVESTMENT CORPORATION, PAUL H. 
[THEOBALD, VERN RISSLER, FLOYD : 
SUMSION, CHESTER ZOLLINGER, 
GAYLORD SWIM, ARNOLD HENDRICK-: 
SON, INNOVATION ENTERPRISES 
INCORPORATED, LOWELL CHRISTENSEN 
SID A. BOURNE, JACK HOPKINSON, 
GLEN ROLAND and ROBERT BEALE 
III on behalf of themselves and 
all other stockholders of 
Shelley Irrigation Development, 
Inc., 
FINDINGS OF FACT AND 
CONCLUSIONS OF LAW 
Plaintiffs, 
vs. 
jSHELLEY DEVELOPMENT, 
INC., a corporation, NED R. 
[PHELLEY, DEAUN SHELLEY, NED 
(RUSSELL SHELLEY, JR., and 
CHARLES EVERETT HULL, 
Defendants. 
Civil No. 40094 
The plaintiffs' Motion to Dismiss the Counterclaim pursuant to 
Rule 41(b) of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure came on before the 
jfcourt for hearing. The parties having previously submitted to the 
fcourt memorandum and in addition, the parties were allowed to put on 
Evidence pertaining to that issue on Thursday, September 20, 1984. 
JThe plaintiffs, Bryce W. Baker, Springville Investment Corporation, 
£aul H. Theobald, Vern Rissler, Floyd Sumsion, Gaylord Swim, 
Innovation Enterprises Incorporated, Lowell Christensen, Sid A. 
ourne, and Robert Beale, III, were represented by their attorney, 
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Richard B. Johnson. The plaintiffs, Jack Hopkinson and Glen Roland 
Were represented by their attorney, Robert L. Moody. The plaintiffs 
Chester Zollinger and Arnold Hendrickson were not represented. The 
I i 
defendants were represented by their attorney Lowell V. Summerhays. 
the Court, after considering the memoranda of the parties, having 
jneard testimony and received evidence and being fully advised in the 
premises, now makes and enters the following: 
FINDINGS OF FACT 
1. The Court finds that because of the lapse of time in pro-
secuting this case, it would be unreasonably difficult, if not 
impossible, for the plaintiffs to respond to the claims contained in 
the Counterclaim, and prepare for trial. The Court specifically 
finds that evidence pertaining to the defendants' claims in the 
Counterclaim has been lost and that memories have been dimmed. 
2. The Court finds that the defendants have not been diligent 
tn prosecuting this case to the extent required by Rule 41(b) of 
the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure and the cases pertaining thereto 
which lack of diligence is shown by the facts presented at the 
(evidentiary hearing and the judicial file in this case. 
3. The Court finds that under all of the circumstances includ-
ing but not limited to the record at the evidentiary hearing and thi 
hudicial file that a dismissal of the Counterclaim would not be an 
[injustice. 
From the foregoing Findings of Fact, the Court now makes and 
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CL.CNT INFORMATION COI , 
Please call us if you have any questions 
DECEIVED MAR 2 8 1379 
Owighl C. Flickinger J 
Attorney for Defendants 
Suite 104, 2200 North Central Avenue 
Phoenix, Arizona 
(602) 258-8831 \ . 
\P $7 
Ul THE FOURTH DISTRICT COURT IN AND FOR UTAH COUNTY 
STATE OF UTAH 
Qryce W. Daker; et al, 
Plaintiffs, 
v. 
Shelley Irrigation Development, 
Inc., a corporation; et al, 
Defendants. 
Civil No. 40,094 
STIPULATION FOR DISMISSAL 
OF RECEIVERSHIP 
The plaintiffs, by and through their attorney, 11. OAYL 
JEFFS, and the defendants, by and through their attorney, DWIGHT 
C. FLICKINGER, hereby stipulate that the Order dated the 17th day 
of May, 1074 confirming the appointment of the Receiver, SIDNEY 
A. GILBERT, as Receiver of SHELLEY IRRIGATION DEVELOPMENT, INC. 
and of all the business property of the individual defendants and 
that the Order of the 9th day of October, 1974 (to the extent 
that it provides for a continuation of the receivership) and that 
the Order of the 22nd day of November, 1974 and all subseouent 
Orders of the Court confirming the continuation of the receiver-
ship be vacated' ana that the Motion for Appointment uf Receiver, 
heretofore granted on both a temporary and permanent basis, be 
dismissed without prejudice. 
It is specifically acknowledged between the parties tha* 
this Stipulation far termination of the receiversh in is in no 
way an exoneration of the Receiver anu/or the nlainliffs (with 
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the exception of a previous exoneration granted to the Receiver 
for any conduct he might have performed as a Receiver between 
the dates of March 29, 1974 and September 18, 1974) and that 
the above Stipulation cannot be construed as an admission of 
liability or of wrongdoing in any nature whatsoever by the plain-
tiffs. 
It is further specifically acknowledged by the parties 
that the Stipulation for Dismissal of the Receivership shall in 
no way preclude the parties from pursuing their respective claims 
as set forth in the Complaint and the Counterclaim. 
The parties further stipulate that this case may be 
placed on the inactive calendar subject to reactivation by court 
or counsel as may be procedurally proper subsequent hereto. 
The parties further stipulate that the Receiver may, 
on his own motion or that any party may on its own motion, requesti 
an accounting by the Receiver and/or a hearing as to any liability 
incurred by the Receiver and/or the Receiver's right to exonera-
tion. 
The parties further acknowledge that this Stipulation 
formalizes the Stipulation made in open court on March 19, 1979 
which was heretofore acted upon by the Honorable J. Robert Qulloc 
in ordering a dismissal of the Receivership, effective that date. 
DATED this day of , 1979. 
JEFFS AND JEFFS 
M. Dayle Jef 
Attorneys for Pla'in'tiffs 
90 North 100 East 
Provo, Utah 84601 
DATED this J2jJ^L day o f ^ ^ ^ ^ ^ Z 1979. 
BLAKE, COLTCR, FLICK1NGER, OAUDET 
& SHIELDS 
DwicTht C. £1fchn(ier, P.C. 
Attorney for Defendants 
Suite 104, 2200 North Central Avenue 
Phoenix, Arizona 85004 
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O R D E R 
This matter having come on for hearing at a pretrial 
conference on March 19, 1979 at 2:00 p.m. and the plaintiffs 
being represented by their counsel, ft. UAYLC JETFS, and the de-
fendants being represented by their counsel, DUIGllT C. FLICKINGCR, 
and 
The court having entertained an oral stipulation by 
counsel pretaining to the vacating of previous Orders of Receiver 
ship and the dismissal without prejudice of the motion for a 
Receiver, and 
The above written Stipulation appearing consistent with 
the oral stipulation presented to the court on the 19th day of 
March, 1979, 
IT IS HEREBY ORDERED, ADJUDGED AND DECREED that both 
the confirmation and the appointment of the Receiver, SIDNEY A. 
GILBERT, as Receiver of SHELLEY IRRlGATlOll UCVILOPHLUT , 1UC. and 
of all the business property of the individual defendants is 
hereby rescinded, effective March 19, 1979. 
IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that the issue of exoneration of 
the Receiver shall be reserved until appropriately brought be-
fore this Honorable Court by the Receiver or any of the parties 
and 
IT IS HEREBY FURTHER ORDERED that the Receiver not be 
required to provide an accounting unless requested by the Re-
ceiver himself or any of the parties hereto. 
IT IS FURTHER ORDERED placing this case on the inactive 
calendar until further notice. 
DONE ifl OPEN COURT th 
HONO, 
•3-
